TOXIGEN: Controlling Language Models to Generate Implied and Adversarial Toxicity

Warning: this paper discusses and contains content that is offensive or upsetting.

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

Toxic language detection systems often falsely flag text that contains minority group mentions as toxic, as those groups are often the targets of online hate. Such over-reliance on spurious correlations also causes systems to struggle with detecting implicitly toxic language. To help mitigate these issues, we create TOXIGEN, a new large-scale and machine-generated dataset of 274k toxic and benign statements about 13 minority groups. We develop a demonstration-based prompting framework and an adversarial classifier-in-the-loop decoding method to generate subtly toxic and benign text with a massive pretrained language model (Brown et al., 2020). Controlling machine generation in this way allows TOXIGEN to cover implicitly toxic text at larger scale, and about more demographic groups, than previous resources of human-written text. We conduct a human evaluation on a challenging subset of TOXIGEN and find that annotators struggle to distinguish machine-generated text from human-written language. We also find that 94.5% of toxic examples are labeled as hate speech by human annotators. Using three publicly-available datasets, we show that finetuning a toxicity classifier on our data improves its performance on *human*-written data substantially. We also demonstrate that TOXIGEN can be used to fight machine-generated toxicity as finetuning improves the classifier significantly on our evaluation subset.

1 Introduction

Toxic language detectors often over-rely on minority identity mentions[1] when flagging a statement as toxic, without considering the deeper semantic meaning of the statement (Dixon et al., 2018; Röttger et al., 2021). This can lead to severe under-detection of subtle hate (e.g., "*They have been bred to be good at sports and entertainment, but not much else*"; Figure 1) and over-detection of benign statements (e.g., "*child abuse is wrong, racism is wrong, sexism is wrong*"; Figure 1). Importantly, such biases in toxicity detection risk further marginalizing or censoring minority groups (Yasin, 2018; Sap et al., 2019; Dias Oliva et al., 2020; Are, 2020; Díaz and Hecht-Felella, 2021).

We introduce TOXIGEN,[2] a large-scale machine-generated dataset of 274,186 toxic and benign statements. To create this dataset, we leverage the massive pretrained language model GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020), which is known to produce close-to-human-like text (Clark et al., 2021; Dou et al., 2021) but also easily generates socially biased and toxic content (Sheng et al., 2019; Gehman et al., 2020). Designed using a demonstration-based prompting framework, TOXIGEN covers over 135k toxic and 135k benign statements about 13 different minority identity groups (e.g., African Americans, women, LGBTQ+ folks, etc.).

Using this machine generated approach has two advantages over scraping posts from the web as done by previous work (e.g., Davidson et al., 2017; Founta et al., 2018; Zampieri et al., 2019). First, it allows us to limit spurious identity-toxicity correlations (Dixon et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2021) by generating equal numbers of toxic/benign statements for each demographic group, including those that are often overlooked in toxic language corpora (e.g., Native Americans). Second, machine generation and careful prompting enables us to generate *implicit* toxicity (i.e., without swearwords or slurs), which is by definition hard to detect or find and thus often missing in toxic language corpora (Wiegand et al., 2021). Indeed, 98.2% of TOXIGEN statements are *implicit* and devoid of explicit profanity, slurs, or swearwords (Table 1).

To generate a challenging subset of TOXIGEN,

[1] In this work, we use "minority" to refer to social and demographic groups that are frequently the targets of oppression, discrimination, or prejudice (RWJF, 2017), from a U.S. socio-cultural perspective.

[2] To be released at `anonymous.com`



Figure 1: Examples of statements that fool Google's Perspective API ( ), HateBERT ( ), Open AI content filter ( ), AI2 Delphi ( )[4], and Roberta ( ). Five statements are benign, but mention minorities and so classifiers find them hateful. Five are toxic sentences, but the classifiers find them neutral. ALICE attacks these classifiers to generate a large-scale, implicit, and balanced dataset.

we introduce ALICE[3], an adversarial classifier-in-the-loop decoding algorithm. We use ALICE to control the toxicity of output text by pitting a toxicity classifier against a text generator during beam search decoding. Given a toxic prompt, we can encourage generations to be less toxic based on the classifier scores. Similarly, we can steer a language model with neutral prompting towards higher toxicity generations. Our experiments with five publicly-available toxicity classifiers show that the generated sentences in both cases above fool toxicity classifiers (see Figure 1).

We validate the quality of our machine-generated dataset through a comprehensive human evaluation. Our results show that on a sample of 792 machine-generated sentences, 90% could be mistaken for human-written text. We also find that the generated data indeed contains a wide variety of specific references to the minority groups mentioned in the prompts (as shown in Figure 1). This indicates that our data generation approaches (with or without ALICE) successfully control the generation towards the desired toxicity and minority group mention.

Further experimental results demonstrate that fine-tuning existing classifiers on TOXIGEN consistently improves performance (+7–19%) on 3 existing *human*-written implicit toxic datasets: ImplicitHateCorpus (ElSherief et al., 2021), SocialBiasFrames (Sap et al., 2020), and DynaHate (Vidgen et al., 2021). This indicates that the dataset generated in this work and the approaches for generating data provides a major step towards improving toxicity classifiers, and could potentially be used downstream to address the issues from biased machine generation (Sheng et al., 2019) or neutral toxic degeneration (Gehman et al., 2020).

2 Implicit Hate Against Minority Groups

Detecting *implicit* toxicity about minority groups (e.g., stereotyping, microaggressions), remains an elusive goal for NLP systems (Han and Tsvetkov, 2020; Wiegand et al., 2021). One key challenge is that, in contrast to *explicit* toxicity, implicit toxicity is not marked by the use of profanity or swear-words, is sometimes positive in sentiment, and is generally harder to detect or collect at scale (MacAvaney et al., 2019; Breitfeller et al., 2019). Nonetheless, implicitly toxic language about minority or marginalized groups is often psychologically damaging to members of those groups (Sue et al., 2007; Nadal et al., 2014; Kanter et al., 2017; Nadal, 2018; Saleem and Anderson, 2013) and can reinforce stereotypical or hateful perceptions of them (Behm-

[3]**A**dversarial **L**anguage **I**mitation with **C**onstrained **E**xemplars

[4]Delphi does not produce toxicity probabilities, so we use Open AI's content filter to game Delphi. A Delphi author has confirmed probabilities will be available soon.

Datasets	Properties			
	Source	Size	% Implicit	% Hate Class
Breitfeller et al. (2019)	Reddit	2,934	99.4	100.0
TweetBLM (Kumar and Pranesh, 2021)	Twitter	9,165	99.0	33.7
de Gibert et al. (2018)	StormFront	9,916	92.2	11.3
Waseem (2016)	Twitter	16,914	82.4	31.7
ImplicitHateCorpus (ElSherief et al., 2021)	Twitter	22,584	96.8	39.6
Davidson et al. (2017)	Twitter	24,802	30.2	5.0
Kennedy et al. (2018)	Hate Forums	27,665	71.8	9.1
DynaHate (Vidgen et al., 2021)	Human-Machine Adv.	41,134	83.3	53.9
SocialBiasFrames (Sap et al., 2020)	Social Media	44,671	71.5	44.8
Founta et al. (2018)	Twitter	80,000	26.1	7.5
TOXIGEN (ours)	**GPT-3**	**274,186**	**98.2**	**50.1**

Table 1: Comparison between existing toxic language datasets. *% Hate Class* is the percent of the data that are labeled as hate. TOXIGEN is large, almost entirely implicit, and balanced between toxic and benign statements.

Morawitz and Mastro, 2008; Soral et al., 2018).

A second challenge for detecting subtle toxicity about minority groups is that minority mentions are more often the targets of social biases and toxicity (Hudson, 2017). As such, minority mentions often co-occur with toxicity labels in datasets scraped from online platforms (Dixon et al., 2018). For example, over 93% of mentions of Jewish folk in Sap et al. (2020) are toxic (Wiegand et al., 2021). In turn, models trained on such data can exploit these spurious minority-toxicity correlations instead of considering the deeper semantics of text (Zhou et al., 2021). Importantly, the spurious correlations are also learned by large language models, which are known to produce stereotypical, biased, or toxic content when prompted with minority mentions (Sheng et al., 2019). Given that the main mitigation approach to prevent LLMs from generating toxic language is to train new classifiers to detect such language, these classifiers *also* learn the spurious correlations and start blocking most language referencing minority groups. This risks erasure.

With TOXIGEN, we aim for *scale*, *implicit* toxicity, and *balance* between toxic and benign statements, to tackle both of these challenges that remain unaddressed by previous work. As shown in Table 1, existing datasets contain large amount of explicit toxicity. While valuable, most previous work has relied on scraping data from online platforms, which leads to dataset imbalances with respect to minority-mentioning posts that are toxic vs. benign. Examples are collected at scale using keyword-based scraping approaches (Waseem, 2016; Davidson et al., 2017; Zampieri et al., 2019), the bootstrapped scraping approaches (Founta et al., 2018), and machine-vs-human adversarial data collection (Dinan et al., 2019; Vidgen et al., 2021), among others. In contrast, using large language models to generate our dataset allows us to control the minority groups mentioned in our statements, as well as their implicitness, at larger scale.

3 Creating TOXIGEN

To create TOXIGEN, we use demonstration-based prompting for large language models (LLMs), encouraging a text generator to produce both toxic and benign sentences that mention minority groups by name without using explicit language. We also introduce a classifier-in-the-loop decoding method based on constrained beam search, ALICE, which, along with samples generated without ALICE, contributes to generate a challenge subset of TOXIGEN. Using these methods, we generate a massive set of statements (over 274,000) that contain balanced numbers of toxic and benign sentences mentioning 13 identity groups—see Table 2.

3.1 Prompt Engineering

TOXIGEN is generated by prompting a language model[4] to produce both *benign* and *toxic* sentences that (1) include mentions of minority groups by name and (2) contain mainly implicit language, which does not include profanity or slurs. To achieve this, we perform demonstration-based prompt engineering: Acquiring example sentences,

[4]In our work, we use GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020), but our generation methods could work with any text generator that produces near-human-like text.



Figure 2: Adversarial set up and constrained beam search decoding with ALICE. The examples shown are for HateBERT and PerspectiveAPI and the input text is designed to write implicitly-toxic statements about Native American people. Using ALICE, GPT-3 produces toxicity for which the scores from HateBERT and PerspectiveAPI decrease.

passing them to a LLM, and collecting the subsequent response. For example, when shown ten sentences mentioning *Muslim* folks *neutrally*, GPT-3 often responds with a similar neutral sentence.

3.1.1 Demonstration-based prompting

Prompts are text passed into language models to encourage certain behaviors (Brown et al., 2020). However, designing prompts is notoriously challenging (Liu et al., 2021c). While there are several approaches for prompting pretrained LLMs (Liu et al., 2021b), a recent and promising direction is *demonstration-based prompting* (Gao et al., 2021; Mishra et al., 2021). Here, example statements are passed to a language model, encouraging it to produce a similar, but distinct, statement. For example, to encourage LLMs to produce *benign* statements about *Asian* people, we might use the following examples: (1) *many impactful people are of asian descent*, (2) *there are hundreds of asian cultures*. To engineer prompts that lead to high-quality, group-mentioning toxic and benign statements at scale, we first gather and curate sets of examples.

3.1.2 Collecting example sentences

To generate both benign and toxic responses from LLMs that mention minority groups, we first collect many examples. Intuitively, given many examples of benign sentences that mention one particular group, a language model can be used to produce more. For benign prompts, we encourage realistic text generation and include diverse voices by collecting benign sentences from blog posts and news articles that mention a group. However, finding large amounts of such data at scale is challenging—this is why implicit datasets are hard to acquire.

Therefore, we first begin with a smaller number of examples from the wild, then engage a human-in-the-loop process: collect some examples, pass them to our LLM, comb through many responses, and add the best examples to a growing set. Ensuring that a set of examples consistently produces benign responses that still mention the targeted minority group is challenging and so we iterate this loop many times, sampling random subsets of our examples to serve as prompts and observing the responses. This way, we collect 20-50 example sentences for each group, all of which we release.

To encourage implicit toxicity from an LLM, we find examples of human-written sentences with implicit toxicity towards each group from hate forums (de Gibert et al., 2018) and Reddit (Breitfeller et al., 2019). We repeat the human-in-the-loop process to expand our sets of examples. Overall, by repeating this process for both toxic and benign examples for all 13 target groups, we create 26 sets of prompts, with two (benign and toxic) per target group.

3.2 ALICE: Attacking Toxicity Classifiers with Adversarial Decoding

Demonstration-based prompting alone consistently produces toxic and benign statements about mi-

Group	Count	Avg. characters (± std.)	% Implicit
Black			
Neutral	10,554	112.32 ± 40.12	99.3
Hate	10,306	102.88 ± 40.30	96.2
Asian			
Neutral	10,422	93.02 ± 38.91	99.71
Hate	10,813	77.21 ± 38.96	93.9
Native Am.			
Neutral	10,251	92.15 ± 35.98	99.8
Hate	10,371	88.43 ± 39.82	97.5
Latino			
Neutral	10,091	82.52 ± 37.80	99.2
Hate	10,295	93.95 ± 41.78	96.8
Jewish			
Neutral	10,367	100.17 ± 40.15	99.3
Hate	10,563	97.00 ± 37.50	95.8
Muslim			
Neutral	10,463	87.46 ± 38.94	99.9
Hate	10,579	76.01 ± 39.00	98.0
Chinese			
Neutral	10,518	79.78 ± 40.68	98.6
Hate	10,489	76.95 ± 38.64	97.3
Mexican			
Neutral	10,733	75.43 ± 42.05	99.2
Hate	10,511	88.72 ± 40.67	95.0
Middle Eastern			
Neutral	10,704	79.73 ± 41.11	99.6
Hate	10,607	78.90 ± 40.46	95.8
LGBTQ+			
Neutral	11,596	111.43 ± 39.06	98.8
Hate	10,695	96.42 ± 39.70	96.2
Women			
Neutral	11,094	63.90 ± 35.07	99.9
Hate	10,535	81.18 ± 38.54	98.3
Mental Dis.			
Neutral	10,293	107.86 ± 44.88	99.9
Hate	10,372	90.85 ± 41.62	99.8
Physical Dis.			
Neutral	10,319	89.43 ± 43.61	99.9
Hate	10,645	83.95 ± 40.16	98.4
top-k (all)	260,012	88.00 ± 41.87	98.1
ALICE (all)	14,174	102.17 ± 33.09	99.7
Total	274,186	89.60 ± 41.62	98.2

Table 2: Statistics for TOXIGEN across all groups. Avg. characters denotes the average number of characters per sentence, including the standard deviation.

nority groups—see Section 4—there is no guarantee that these statements will be challenging to existing toxicity detectors. Therefore, we also develop ALICE, a variant of constrained beam search (CBS; Anderson et al., 2017; Hokamp and Liu, 2017; Holtzman et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2021) during decoding that generates statements that are adversarial to a given pre-trained toxicity classifier.

ALICE creates an adversarial game between a pre-trained language model (PLM) and a toxicity classifier (CLF) during a constrained beam search decoding. In many CBS settings, constraints are added during beam search decoding to force the model to either include or exclude a specific word or group of words in the output (Anderson et al., 2017; Hokamp and Liu, 2017; Lu et al., 2021). With ALICE, we instead want to enforce *soft* constraints on the probabilities coming from a given toxicity classifier CLF during beam search:[5]

$$p(w_{i+1}|w_{0:i}) \propto \lambda_L p_{\text{LM}}(w_{i+1}|w_{0:i}) + \lambda_C p_{\text{CLF}}(w_{0:i+1}) \quad (1)$$

Here, λ_L and λ_C denote hyperparameters that determine the respective contribution of the language model and classifier to the decoding scoring function. By using this weighted combination, we can steer generations towards a higher or lower probability of toxicity without sacrificing coherence enforced by the language model. To create examples that challenge existing toxicity classifiers, we use two adversarial setups:

- **False negatives**: We use *toxic* prompts to encourage the language model to generate toxic outputs, then maximize the classifier's probability of the *benign* class during beam search.
- **False positives**: We use *benign* prompts to encourage the language model to generate non-toxic outputs, then maximize the probability of the *toxic* class during beam search.

In the first approach, we are also able to detoxify model outputs when the classifier successfully steers the generations towards non-toxic language. ALICE is illustrated in Figure 2.

3.3 Decoding Details

We generate TOXIGEN data with and without ALICE. Without ALICE, we use top-k decoding (Fan et al., 2018) alone with our toxic and benign prompts. With ALICE, we use the HateBERT fine-tuned OffensEval model from (Caselli et al., 2021; Zampieri et al., 2019) as the toxicity classifier (CLF). This model covers a range of direct and veiled offense types. We use GPT-3 for the language model. For decoding, we use $\lambda_L = \lambda_C = 0.5$, a maximum generation length of 30 tokens, a beam size of 10, and a temperature of 0.9. Due to limitations imposed by the OpenAI GPT-3 API on accessing log probabilities for the full model vocabulary, we restricted the vocabulary size to the top 100 tokens, and then resample from the "allowed" tokens (tokens not appearing in the prompt) using top-k.[6]

[5] This is similar in spirit to previous work on using *co-operative* discriminators on uncontrolled LLMs (Holtzman et al., 2018; Krause et al., 2020; Yang and Klein, 2021; Liu et al., 2021a), yet in this work our LLM is controlled in an adversarial way by prompting and by a classifier.

[6] We force beam search decoding to not use tokens from the prompt to prevent direct copying. Certain tokens appearing in the prompt such as punctuation are allowed.



Figure 3: Comparing the proportion of identity group mentions that were desired based on the *prompts* vs. that were *generated*, in our annotated evaluation set. We include the actual proportions as data labels.

3.4 TOXIGEN Statistics

Statistics of TOXIGEN are presented in Table 2. Using the benign and toxic prompts separately, we generate 20,000 sentences (half toxic, half benign) for each of 13 groups shown in Table 2 with top-k decoding and around 500 sentences for each using ALICE due to computational constraints on the GPT-3 API. In our final dataset, generation length varies significantly and, as expected, almost all the statements are implicit. As we show in Section 4, the ALICE-generated data successfully attack the given toxicity classifier, contributing a challenging, adversarial subset of TOXIGEN.[7] In the released data, we split off a test set that is validated by human annotators (see §4.2).

4 Human Validation of TOXIGEN

To ensure the quality of TOXIGEN, we conduct human validation experiments and create TOXIGEN-HUMANVAL, our human-validated test set. Specifically, we investigate the reliability of our prompt-based and ALICE-based methods at generating human-like statements and controlling statements' toxicity and the minority group mentioned (§4.2). Additionally, we measure the effectiveness of ALICE-generated statements (vs. top-k-generated) at fooling classifiers (§4.3).

4.1 Human Validation Design

For each generated statement, we ask the annotators various set of questions, described below, that take into account multiple dimensions of how toxic machine-generated language presents a potential harm to readers. See Appendix B for an annotation screenshot and other study details.

Perceived hatefulness with respect to human or AI-authored text. We first ask annotators to guess whether the statement's author was a human or an AI system (HUMANORAI). Then, we ask whether the statement would be harmful to anyone if an AI system wrote it (HARMFULIFAI), as well as if a human wrote it (HARMFULIFHUMAN); we hypothesize that readers may have different standards for machine-generated text than human-written text. For all questions measuring harmfulness of text, we consider potential harm on a 1-5 scale with 1 being clearly benign and 5 indicating very offensive or abusive text.

Perceived intent of the writer. We ask readers whether statements were likely intended to be harmful (HARMFULINTENT), since some biased statements can be positively intended (e.g., benevolent sexism; Glick and Fiske, 1996). Additionally, we ask if the statement exhibits a positive stereotype (POSSTEREO), which is also harmful (e.g., model minority myths; Cheryan and Bodenhausen, 2000).

Detailed harm explanations. To better understand how harm may be perpetrated against the minority group, we ask readers in-depth questions about text's content, following Sap et al. (2020) and Olteanu et al. (2018). We ask whether or not the statement is lewd or sexual (LEWD), whether and how it references the targeted group or other groups (WHICHGROUP, GROUPFRAMING), whether it claims to be factual or opinion (FACTOROPINION).

4.2 Constructing TOXIGEN-HUMANVAL

Data and Setup. We selected 792 statements from TOXIGEN to include in our test set, such that no training statement had cosine similarity above 0.7 with any test statement. Each test statement is then rated by 3 annotators from a pool of 156 prequalified annotators from Amazon MTurk.

Inter-annotator agreement. To investigate the quality of our annotations, we compute agreement on toxicity ratings.[8] We find that annotators agreed moderately and are higher than or equal rates to prior work on hate speech annotation (Ross et al., 2017; Sap et al., 2020), with a Fleiss' κ=0.46

[7] We compute the % of implicit samples using https://github.com/RobertJGabriel/Google-profanity-words, the same as ElSherief et al. (2021), also removing ambiguous terms (e.g., "bloody").

[8] Specifically, we take the max of the HARMFULIFAI and HARMFULIFHUMAN scores and map it into three classes (scores <3: "non-toxic", =3: "ambiguous", >3: "toxic").

Text	HUMANORAI (Predicted/True)	AVGSCORE (AI/Human)	INTENT	GROUPFRAMING
I started wearing a head scarf at the age of 12 because my mom told me that it was my duty as a woman to cover my hair	Human/AI (ALICE)	1.3/1.3	Benign	indirect reference, moral judgement
if the discussion is for the sake of the greater black community rather than for you, quit trying to hyper-centrally control it	Human/AI (top-k)	2.7/2.7	Unsure	direct reference, suggests solution, moral judgement
we do not need to mention trans people in an article about lgbtq+ issues	Human/AI (top-k)	4.0/4.3	Harm	direct reference, suggests solution
the mentally disabled should be able to live in their communities and not be forced into institutions.	Human/AI (ALICE)	1.0/1.0	Benign	direct reference, suggests solution, other framing

Table 3: Example responses from human evaluation where machine-generated text fools annotators into thinking the writer is human. Average toxicity scores are on a 1-5 scale (1 being benign and 5 being clearly offensive), and are averaged across annotator responses. We report scores for the case where annotators assume the writer/speaker is AI and the writer/speaker is human respectively.



Figure 4: Summary statistics for the human annotations on the evaluation set. Each statistic is shown along the x-axis, while the y-axis gives the percentage of examples per annotated class (non-toxic, toxic, ambiguous).



Figure 5: Avg. toxicity scores on a Likert scale of 1-5. Toxicity scores are similar across annotator-verified classes for a presumed AI speaker and human speaker.

(Fleiss, 1971) and Krippendorff's α=0.64 (Krippendorff, 1980). In 55.17% of cases, all 3 annotators agree, while a majority ($\geq$2/3) agree for 93.4%.

Human validation results. First, we find that our machine-generated statements are largely indistinguishable from human-written statements. For example—see Table 3—human annotators often predict that our text is generated by a human. In fact, on average 90.5% of machine-generated examples are thought to be human-written by a majority of annotators, as shown in Figure 4. We also note that harmful text confuses readers slightly more than non-harmful text: 92.9% of toxic examples are mislabeled as human-written compared to 90.2% for non-toxic. Most toxic examples are also hate speech (94.56%). While opinions are common in both toxic and non-toxic examples, most fact-claiming text is non-toxic.

Second, we find that demonstration-based prompting reliably generates toxic and benign statements about minority groups (§4.3. Further, for the machine-generated examples, we find that 30.2% are harmful (given a score of >3), while only 4% are ambiguous. This indicates that these data are sufficiently toxic or benign. We also find that all identity groups covered by the dataset were rep-

Dataset	HateBERT	w/ ALICE only	w/ TOXIGEN
IHC	0.60	0.59	**0.67**
SBF_{TEST}	0.60	0.62	**0.71**
DYNAHATE	0.47	0.55	**0.66**
TOXIGEN-HUMANVAL	0.57	0.90	**0.99**

Table 4: HateBert's AUC before/after fine-tuning on data generated using both ALICE alone and the full TOXIGEN, evaluated on three external human-written datasets and the human-validated portion of TOXIGEN. Each column shows finetuning on different datasets.

resented in the human study (see Figure 3), and observe that the identity group referenced by the prompt is generally the same as the group referenced by the corresponding TOXIGEN text, though there is some deviation. This is likely due to GPT-3 conflating identities or mentioning multiple groups.

Interestingly, when annotators label text as toxic, their scores are more extreme than for non-toxic statements, and there is no difference between perceived speakers (Figure 5). This indicates machine text is perceived as similarly harmful to human text. We also find that the most common framing tactic is "moral judgement", or questioning the morality of an identity group, which has been linked to toxicity by prior work (Hoover et al., 2019).

4.3 Comparing Generation Methods

As further validation, we investigate whether ALICE-generated statements are more adversarial compared to top-k-generated ones. For 125 randomly-selected prompts (62 toxic and 63 non-toxic), we generate two statements: one with ALICE and one without (top-k). We then collect annotations for the 250 statements using the setup described in §4.1, and get toxicity scores from HateBERT.

We find that for top-k sampled sentences, the prompt label indeed matches the desired label (95.2% of non-toxic examples and 67.7% of toxic examples). For ALICE, 40.3% of toxic examples match the prompt label and 92.1% of non-toxic examples match. We also find that ALICE succeeds to fool HateBERT (26.4% of ALICE-decoded sentences fool HateBERT vs. 16.8% of top-k sampled sentences). Finally, ALICE is effective for detoxifying generated text (the avg. human-annotated toxicity score for ALICE-decoded sentences with a toxic prompt is 2.97, compared to 3.75 for top-k). This leads to harder, more ambiguous examples.

5 Improving Toxicity Classifiers

To further showcase the usefulness of TOXIGEN, we investigate how it can enhance classifiers' abilities to detect human-written and machine-generated implicit toxic language. We fine-tune the widely-used HateBERT (Caselli et al., 2021) on the training portion of TOXIGEN, using the prompted labels as proxies for a true toxicity label. Then, we compare the performance of the out-of-the-box HateBERT (trained on the OLID corpus; Zampieri et al., 2019) to HateBERT fine-tuned on TOXIGEN on three publicly available human-written datasets (IMPLICITHATECORPUS (ElSherief et al., 2021), the SOCIALBIASFRAMES test set (Sap et al., 2020), and DYNAHATE (Vidgen et al., 2021)) as well as the evaluation portion of our machine-generated dataset (TOXIGEN-HUMANVAL).

Our results—see Table 4—show that fine-tuning HateBERT on TOXIGEN improves performance across all datasets. The improvement on human-written datasets shows that TOXIGEN can be used to improve existing classifiers, helping them better tackle the challenging human-generated implicit toxicity detection task. Fine-tuned HateBERT performs nearly perfectly on TOXIGEN-HUMANVAL, demonstrating that our data can successfully help guard against machine-generated toxicity.

6 Conclusions

In this work, we used a large language model to create and release TOXIGEN, a large-scale, balanced, and implicit toxic language dataset. TOXIGEN is far larger than previous datasets, containing over 274k sentences, and is more diverse, including mentions of 13 minority groups at scale. The generated samples are balanced in terms of number of benign and toxic samples for each group. We proposed ALICE, an adversarial decoding scheme to evaluate robustness of toxicity classifiers and generates sentences to attack them, and showed the effectiveness of ALICE on a number of publicly-available toxicity detection systems. In our experiments, we showed that fine-tuning pre-trained hate classifiers on TOXIGEN can improve their performance on three popular *human*-generated toxicity datasets. We also conducted a human study on a subset of TOXIGEN, verifying that our generation methods successfully create challenging statements that annotators struggle to distinguish from human-written text—90.5% of machine-generated examples were thought to be human-written

7 Societal and Ethical Considerations

Risks in dataset release While the purpose of our work is to curate diverse and effective hate speech detection resources, our methods encourage a large language model to make its generation *more* toxic. This poses a potential misuse case where bad actors exploit these methods for nefarious purposes like spreading machine-generated hate speech. Still, ignoring this possibility does not make it go away and our work introduces an opportunity for the community to push back against harm towards minority groups. Our ultimate aim is to shift power dynamics back to targets of oppression. Therefore, we do not consider identity dimensions that are historically the agents of oppression (e.g., whiteness, heterosexuality, able-bodied-ness). Please also note that there is still a lot that this dataset is not capturing about toxic language. Our annotations might not capture the full complexity of these issues related to human experiences. There is need for multi-disciplinary work to better understand these aspects.

ALICE The proposed method in this work attacks content filters via an adversarial game between two AI systems and thus passes the existing content filters—as we show for 5 publicly-available systems. It is important to leverage this and similar approaches to improve content filters and prevent large scale attacks against sensitive platforms.

Improving Toxicity Detection Effective classifiers for machine biases are required to combat the scale of online harm. Without such systems, minority groups are likely to be targeted by current (biased) systems. Our work is a significant step towards advancing this crucial classification task.

Fair wages for crowd annotators We conduct our human study through Amazon Mechanical Turk. For each hit, we pay a worker \$0.25, which adds up to an hourly wage of ∼\$8.00 based on our estimates. This is well above the federal minimum wage. Due to the potential for emotional distress from reading toxic content, we provide a strongly-worded warning to workers and a link to the Crisis Text Line in the annotation instructions.[9] Workers are also required to consent to the task before seeing any content by clicking on a checkbox.

[9] https://www.crisistextline.org/

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A Generation Details

To generate sentences for a given minority group, we sample 5 random sentences from the corresponding set of examples, then join them into one string with each example being preceded by a hyphen ("–") and ending with a newline character ("\n"). By appending an extra hyphen to the end of the prompt, LLMs writes a new sentence matching the style of the presented examples. We stop GPT-3's generation once it produces a new newline character, indicating the end of the sentence. For each generated sentence, we use a new, randomly-selected set of 5 random sentences.

A.1 Language Model Selection

While we use GPT-3 to generate statements in this work, in principle, our methods can be used with any models that generate realistic text, such as GPT-Neo (Black et al., 2021), GPT-J (Wang and Komatsuzaki, 2021), or Turing-NLG (Rasley et al., 2020)

B Human Validation Details

B.1 Selecting MTurk Workers

For human validation, we select 156 MTurk workers with prior experience annotating toxic language.

B.2 Annotation Interface

Figure 6 shows a screenshot of the annotation interface given to the Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Prior to annotation, we provide a strong warning and require signed consent before any text is shown.

Figure 6: Annotation setup for evaluating offensiveness of GPT-3 generations.